In order for the reader to appreciate both the strength and magnitude of the foregoing position and the need for regional economic integration to be part of a multipronged strategy to address poverty, it is appropriate for us to provide a glimpse of poverty in our world.
A glimpse into poverty and the nexus between poverty and regional economic integration
We know that poverty is concerned with the standard of living (and standard of death) of a particular group of people, the poor. As Arimah (2004) points out, poverty is traditionally defi ned as the inability to attain a minimum standard of living, including the deprivation of basic capabilities -which in turn manifests itself in reduced life expectancy, poor health and participation in development, personal insecurity, degradation of the environment, and the absence of meaningful opportunities for the poor to lead valued and respectable lives. The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus succinctly captures this when he asks: "so why should one billion plus people on the planet suffer through a life-time of misery and indignity and spend every moment of their lives looking for food for physical survival alone? We must fi nd some explanations. This will help us achieve the 2015 millennium development goals." The United Nations Millennium Project (see www.unmillenniumproject.org ) provides some compelling statistics on poverty. The key facts and fi gures are the following:
• More than 800 million people go to bed hungry every day, and 300 million of them are children. Exhibit 3.1 is a depiction of child poverty in Africa. Of these 300 million children, only 8 percent are victims of famine or other emergency situations. More than 90 percent are suffering long-term malnourishment and micronutrient defi ciency. In Africa poverty is largely (but not exclusively) a rural phenomenon.
• More than one billion people in the world live on less than $1 a day. Another 2.7 billion struggle to survive on less than $2 per day. The Millennium Project makes the useful point that poverty in the developing world, however, goes far beyond income poverty: it means having to walk more than one mile everyday simply to collect water and fi rewood; it means suffering diseases that were eradicated from rich countries decades ago.
Exhibit 3.1: Poverty, in Zambia and Africa, is mostly a rural phenomenon
• In some deeply impoverished nations, less than half of the children are in primary school and under 20 percent go to secondary school. Around the world, a total of 114 million children do not get even a basic education and 584 million women are illiterate.
• Every year six million children die from malnutrition before their fi fth birthday.
• Every 30 seconds an African child dies of malaria -more than one million child deaths a year.
• The United Nations Millennium Project goes further to point out that 80 percent of farmers in Africa are women, yet more than 40 percent of these women do not have access to basic education.
Africa as a whole has the highest poverty levels of any developing region in the world. In fact, according to the World Bank (1994) , the share of people living in poverty is larger in Africa -and the poor are poorer -than in any other region in the world. Some of the factors that have worsened the poverty situation in Africa undoubtedly include civil wars and confl icts, political strife, droughts, high external debt, disease (especially malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS) as well as acts of terrorism and religious intolerance witnessed as recently as Christmas Day of 2011 in some four cities in Nigeria or the January 2013 terrorist incident at a natural gas production facility in Algeria that left many innocent people dead. Table 3 .1 provides a deeper understanding of the poverty situation in Africa. It shows the 42 poorest countries on earth. Some key observations from Table 3 .1 include the following:
• 35 of the world's 42 poorest countries (83 percent) are in Africa. Not shown in Table 3 .1 but still equally signifi cant is the fact that 18 of the world's 20 poorest per capita income countries are in fact in Africa (see, among others, Holland, 2008 ).
• 13 of the 35 countries in Africa (37 percent) that are among 42 of the world's poorest nations are in COMESA.
• Since COMESA had 19 countries as of January 2012, having 13 of them on the list of the world's poorest nations means that 68 percent of COMESA member states are poor.
• Not shown in Table 3 .1 , but equally signifi cant, is the fact that 27 (or 56 percent) of the world's 48 poorest nations are either in COMESA (13 -or 27 percent) or in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at 14 (29 percent). • Measures of underdevelopment -as seen earlier, some of the basic measures and manifestations of underdevelopment in poor countries (UN, 2011) are extreme poverty, weak human capacities, low income levels, wide income disparities, scarce domestic fi nancial resources, high levels of economic vulnerability, raw-material-based economies that are prone to low value-added productivity levels, disease, drought, debt, and dependence on a limited variety of exports, and, fi nally, unacceptable living and sanitary conditions. There is also the issue of unacceptably low levels of female participation in development as a direct manifestation of underdevelopment. On most of these key performance indicators (KPIs), unfortunately Africa has the most distressing development record.
Africa: a continent that is too rich to be poor
The poverty levels in Africa that we have just demonstrated are unacceptable when one considers the depth and breadth of natural resources and natural endowments that are prevalent on the continent. In other words, Africa is really too rich to be as poor as it is. Just how resource-rich is the African continent? Consider the following facts:
• Population : sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has some 841 million people (2010 population estimates), which is a huge enough human asset base for socio-economic development and sustenance.
• Land area : when adjacent islands such as Madagascar and Mauritius are included, Africa has a land area of some 30.3 million square miles. By comparison, China (which at some 1.5 billion people is the largest country in population terms, a lot larger than that of the African continent) is only some 9.7 million square miles in land area.
• Minerals : the continent is rich in minerals and ores such as oil (Nigeria, Angola, Libya), copper (two of the world's largest producers, Zambia and DR Congo -are in Africa), diamonds (South Africa and Botswana), iron, cobalt, uranium, as well as bauxite and others.
• Lakes, dams and rivers : Africa has some of the largest lakes and dams in the world. Of the world's 10 largest lakes, three are in Africa (Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, and Lake Malawi/Nyasa). The continent also has some of the largest dams in the world: Kariba Dam, Aswan Dam, Akosombo Dam, and the Cahora Bassa Dam, among others. It has some of the largest rivers as well, with huge potential for hydro-electric power generation: the Congo/Zaire River (the deepest river in the world and the world's third largest), the Nile River (longest in Africa), the Zambezi River, Limpopo River, and River Niger. On the tourism front, the continent has spectacular woods, fruits, and other natural attractions, providing one of the world's best tourism destinations and attractions.
Nexus between poverty and regional economic integration
The critical question, at this point, becomes: what linkage and connection can we make between poverty and regional economic integration? At fi rst glance, it makes sense for the poorest countries identifi ed in Table 3 .1 to try any feasible strategies to lift themselves (and their people) out of poverty. Regional Economic Integration is one such feasible strategy, among others. Although regional economic integration is not a panacea or solution that will enable countries to overcome challenges posed by either congenital or fundamental physical, economic, and human-condition defi ciencies, it is meant to be part of a multi-pronged solution towards economic development and poverty alleviation. The poverty-regionalism nexus lies, in other words, in the fact that poverty in Africa illuminates the depth and breadth of the continent's congenital, multifaceted and rather complex development challenge. It is the fact that unlike other developing regions of the world, Africa faces the future while lagging behind the rest of the world on a signifi cant number of development-related indicators. Ultimately, it is the signifi cant fact that in the search for multi-pronged national, regional, and global solutions to Africa's development challenge, regional and continental economic integration ought to be part of the answer; an important part. That is why this chapter became necessary.
Chapter objectives
Every continental region has at least one major economic integration movement: Europe has the European Union (EU); Asia has the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC); North America has the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Latin America has the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), and the Andean Common Market (ANCOM); the Caribbean has the Caribbean Community and Common Market or simply the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); the Middle East has the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU); while Central America has the Central American Common Market (CACM). Africa, however, has some 14 regional economic integration groups, but only eight of these are offi cially recognized as building blocks to stronger economic integration in the 1991 Abuja (Nigeria) treaty establishing the African Union (AU). The AU is the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The eight regional economic communities (RECs) are: the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). A discussion involving all the above economic integration blocks would be an impossible task, and is clearly outside the purview of this chapter. The focus here is therefore on only one of these: COMESA. The chapter utilizes the poverty and regional economic integration nexus provided earlier to ask and address some central questions aimed at achieving the following specifi c objectives:
• To explain why COMESA was formed (integration objectives), and to identify the key driving forces for economic regionalism generally. This part of the discussion will also provide rationales for the choice of COMESA, as well as a history and chronology of regional economic integration movements in Africa.
• To identify key problems and impediments to economic integration in COMESA and Africa generally.
• To describe and analyze COMESA's economic integration experience and record in terms of intra-regional, inter-regional, and global trade.
• To identify and analyze key investment opportunities that exist in Africa for companies, institutions, and other stakeholders in the twenty-fi rst century. The nexus, here, is one where increased economic activity and growth through such investments leads to higher formal employment and, hopefully, lower poverty levels on the continent. • To shed light on the role of mass media in promoting regional economic integration and African development generally.
COMESA aims and forces for economic regionalism
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established by a Treaty in 1994 that transformed its predecessor, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which had existed since 1981 (COMESA, 1994 COMESA was chosen for this chapter for various reasons, including the fact that it is home to some 479.3 million people (the largest of any of Africa's regional economic communities, or RECs). COMESA member states occupy some 12 million square miles in land area, which is about 40 percent of Africa's total land area. COMESA boasts upward of U.S.$244 billion in trade (2010 exports and imports), making it also Africa's largest REC in trade volume (see, among others, COMESA 2008 (see, among others, COMESA , 2010 COMESA Secretariat, 2011) . What gave impetus to COMESA's formation and development? The main reasons for the formation of COMESA (and, by implication, its predecessor, the PTA) included the need to enhance regional cooperation through regional institutions and rules. Member states recognized that unless a large enough economic space could be created to attract and give guarantees to domestic, crossborder, and foreign direct investment, the transformation of their economies from extreme dependence to self-reliance could not be realized. The larger need was to take advantage of a larger market size, to share the region's common heritage and destiny, and to allow greater social and economic cooperation with the ultimate objective of creating an economic community. Member states (see COMESA, 1994) saw their specifi c integration objectives as: (a) the attainment of sustainable growth and development of member states by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of COMESA production and marketing structures; (b) the promotion of joint development in all fi elds of economic activity and the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programs, thus raising the standard of living of its peoples; and fostering closer relations among its member states; (c) cooperation in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border, and domestic investment, including the joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for development; (d) cooperation in the promotion of peace, security, and stability among the member states in order to enhance economic development in the region; (e) cooperation in strengthening the relations between COMESA and the rest of the world and the adoption of common positions in international fora; and (f ) working towards the establishment and realization of the objectives of an African Union (AU). The key path or macro-strategy for achieving these integration objectives included agreement, among COMESA member states, to:
• Set up a full free trade area, guaranteeing the removal of all non-tariff barriers and the free movement of goods and services produced within the COMESA region.
• Establish a Customs Union (CU) with a common external tariff structure that will be applied to goods and services imported from non-COMESA countries.
• Have free movement of capital and investment, supported by the adoption of common investment practices. A related rationale is to have free movement of people within COMESA, supported by the adoption of common visa arrangements.
• Have a progressive setting up of a payments union based on the COMESA Clearing House.
• Establish a Common Monetary Union.
General progression of regionalism
The foregoing COMESA macro-path towards full integration follows the common progression in regionalism. According to Radelet (1999) , formal regional integration and cooperation arrangements vary widely in their structure, objectives, sector coverage, and membership. Regional integration agreements (RIAs) generally are aimed at removing discrimination between foreign and domestic goods, services, and factors of production. There are four classic types of arrangements:
• Free (or Preferential) Trade Areas: in which member countries reduce or eliminate trade barriers between each other, while maintaining trade barriers for non-member countries.
• Customs Unions: in which member countries reduce and eliminate barriers to trade between each other and adopt a common external tariff towards non-member countries.
• Common Markets: in which members expand the basic customs union by reducing the barriers to the movement of factors of production (labor and capital). Regional trading blocs or economic groupings such as COMESA have the common goals of economic transformation and development, hopefully leading to eradication or reduction of poverty in the process. In other words, economic cooperation and integration are not an end in themselves, but rather a means towards sustainable economic development. An early question from the reader, at this point, would run along the lines of, "Well, why should the world worry about Africa?" The answer (World Bank, 2008) lies in the fact that there are far too many poor people in Africa; that greater economic integration is more urgent in Africa because the continent is still largely marginalized globally; that Africa is home to approximately 12 percent of the world's population; yet black Africa (called sub-Saharan Africa, which excludes the Arab North) accounts for less than 2 percent of global trade; and that Africa's share of global agricultural exports (on which the continent has a signifi cant dependence) has been declining for signifi cant periods since 1970. All these are vital statistics that compel global concern and global responses. Hence this chapter on regional economic integration in COMESA.
Other key driving forces for economic regionalism generally
There are other drivers of economic regionalism. Börzel (2011) provides as good a defi nition of regionalism as any, when she refers to processes and structures of region-building in terms of closer economic, political, security, and socio-cultural linkages between states and societies that are in geographic proximity. We utilize the work of Börzel (2011) also to glean the key drivers of regionalism as either demand-related factors or supply-related rationales. Economic drivers center around the argument that welfare gains are larger among nations that are geographically close to one another. Examples of these gains are: reduced transaction costs, economies of scale, technological innovation due to greater competition, more foreign direct investment potentials, and greater economic and political weight in international markets and institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The trade creation versus trade diversion argument features prominently as a rationale for pursuing economic regionalism. Trade creation (a positive effect of integration) occurs when a shift in product origin occurs from a higher-resource-cost producer to a lower-resourcecost producer. This positive effect of integration occurs when the elimination of tariffs and other barriers on member countries' products motivates domestic consumers to demand imports from other member country producers rather than higher-cost (and previously protected) domestic producers. Trade diversion (a negative effect) implies a shift in product origin from a lower-resource-cost non-member to a higher resource-cost member producer. This negative effect of integration occurs when the institution of a common external tariff on non-member countries renders their imports uncompetitive (from a market price perspective) with duty-free member country exports. For a signifi cant net trade creation effect to be revealed, intra-COMESA trade as a proportion of total COMESA world trade should be larger in succeeding years. In other words, the predominance of trade creation in regional economic integration efforts is preferred. Figure 3 .1 is a chronology of key milestones in Africa's integration journey. It starts, logically, with 1910, which is generally recognized as the year in which the earliest regional economic arrangement anywhere in the world was formed. This involved the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which, as Gibb (2006) points out, has had an effectively functioning free trade area based on free movement of goods and the de facto free movement of capital. According to SACU (2002) , goods that are grown, produced, or manufactured in the SACU Common Customs Area, on importation from the area of one member state to the area of another member state, shall be free of customs duties and quantitative restrictions. The members of SACU are South Africa (which has the largest economy of any single country in Africa), Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.
Brief history of regional integration in Africa

Destination African Union (AU)
There is now visible movement towards uniting the continent's many regional trading blocs under one umbrella -the African Economic Community (AEC) -by year 2028. This is envisioned to occur under the auspices of what is now called the African Union (AU), formerly called the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was formed in 1963 as the fi rst broad aspiration toward continental integration and Pan-African political and economic union generally. In a nutshell, Africa's continental integration is being built on regional integration initiatives, with the Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)-based African Union (AU) as the umbrella body. As UNECA (2010) points out, it is the Abuja Treaty that aims to create the AEC -whereby the continent's many separate economic, monetary, fi scal, and social policies applied separately by individual African countries and regional trading blocs will be fully harmonized and integrated into uniform policies common to all. The African Union (2004) states its vision and mission as follows: "The vision of the African Union is that of an Africa integrated, prosperous and peaceful, an Africa driven by its own citizens, a dynamic force in the global arena." Due to space limitations, however, this chapter is only able to discuss and expand on 9 of the 15 impediments, that is: mushrooming of economic trading blocs in Africa; dependence on primary exports; Africa's debt problem; political and governance obstacles to COMESA integration; infrastructural shortcomings; COMESA and the South Africa factor; deleterious effects of war, violence, and drought on regional economic integration; the rising specter of terrorism in Africa; as well as bribery and corruption.
Mushrooming of economic trading blocs in Africa: the "spaghetti bowl" effect
We made the point earlier that Africa has some 14 regional economic integration groups, although only eight of them are offi cially recognized by the African Union as building blocks to stronger economic integration on the continent. The obvious question then is: does the continent really need this many regional economic groupings? As Draper, Halleson, and Alves (2007) point out, most African countries belong to two or more of these regional trading arrangements, with the overlapping and multiple memberships resulting in what has been variously referred to as a "spaghetti bowl" or the fragmentation argument. Yang and Gupta (2007) have gone so far as to call this multiplicity of regional trading arrangements (RTAs) "a dense web of RTAs and a classic example of variable geometry in integration." Multiple membership hinders regional integration by creating a complex entanglement of political commitments and institutional requirements which, in turn, add signifi cantly to the costs of intra-regional trade. Gibb (2009) makes the case that, whereas it may be possible for the free trade areas of COMESA, SADC, SACU, and the EAC to co-exist, it is not possible for any member state to belong to more than one customs union regime. Gibb (2009) uses the case of Zambia (a member of both SADC and COMESA) to make his point. Under the SADC Trade Protocol, Zambia was obligated to dismantle all tariff barriers to South Africa, a fellow SADC member, by 2012. However, Zambia was also obligated, as a result of its COMESA membership, to create a COMESA common external tariff that excluded and discriminated against South Africa (which is not a member of COMESA). Under this scenario, Zambia had in essence agreed to promote free trade with South Africa as well as to maintain tariff barriers against South Africa at the same time!
In Figure 3 .2 we show fi ve of Africa's 14 key regional trading arrangements: EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, SACU, and COMESA. The fi gure illustrates one of the key frustrations and obstacles to effective regional economic integration on the continent -the fact that many nations are members of more than one regional grouping. • Four are also members of the fi ve-nation East African Community (EAC): Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda.
• Eight are also members of the 14-nation Southern African Development Conference (SADC): Malawi, DR Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
• All fi ve members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are also members of the 14-nation SADC.
• Swaziland is a member of three major regional trading blocs: COMESA, SACU, and SADC.
The conclusion, from Figure 3 .2 , is that multiple memberships in RTAs may tend to weaken the integration process. It leads to costly competition (even for attention and resources); confl ict; inconsistencies in policy formulation and implementation; unnecessary duplication of functions and efforts; fragmentation of markets and restriction in the growth potential of the sub-region. SADC was formed in 1980 to reduce member countries' dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. But Nelson Mandela became president of a majority government in South Africa in May 1994, and apartheid has been offi cially over for many years -throwing into serious question SADC's raison d'être.
Dependence on primary/commodity exports
Undermining economic integration in COMESA (and Africa generally) is the fact that, except for South Africa with its diversifi ed and signifi cant manufacturing value-add economy, most African countries have economies that depend on primary commodity production, agriculture, and minerals. There is lack of real tradable goods to external markets by way of manufactures and services.
A major congenital rigidity of most COMESA economies is that their colonial masters encouraged the development and export of a few primary raw material products meant to service factories in Europe, a situation that has changed very little since. Oxfam (1993) goes so far as to suggest that overdependence on commodity exports on depression-prone world markets is at the heart of Africa's trade crisis. More than any other developing region, Africa depends on primary commodities -such as coffee, cocoa, cotton, and copper -to generate the foreign exchange needed to buy imports. For historical/colonial reasons, Africa's major export markets are also identical, a fact which causes its own problems. Table 3 .2 shows the extent of commodity export dependency among 26 African countries, 10 of them members of COMESA. Primary commodities constitute an average of 82.6 percent of total export earnings for these countries, of which 59.4 percent are from single commodities. Apart from creating balance of payments problems if production of single commodities is disrupted, any slump in world commodity prices erodes the ability of COMESA economies to maintain investment in infrastructure, to say nothing about the negative effects on regional integration efforts. The World Bank (2011a) indicates, for instance, that in 21 percent of sub-Sahara African countries one or two primary products account for 75 percent of total exports, a fi gure that does not help the cause of economic growth when such products are vulnerable to global economic downturns.
Africa's debt problem
Africa, generally, has experienced mounting external indebtedness accompanied by very high debt service ratios which have diverted a signifi cant portion of export earnings from development programs (including those that are specifi cally integration-related) to debt servicing. A debt service ratio measures debt-service payments as a percent of export earnings. COMESA countries do not have the capacity to service existing debt from export earnings, capital, and aid fl ows without undue burden on their people. No one is more succinct about Africa's debt problem than Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Africa's fi rst/former UN Secretary General, when he said that external debt is a millstone around the neck of Africa (Oxfam, 1993) . Any attempt at appreciating Africa's debt situation ought to start by recognizing that debt problems are largely a symptom of other sources of economic diffi culty (such as political turmoil, failed government policies, and worse-than-expected terms of trade), and it is these -as one author observes -which make loan repayment burdensome. A shortage of foreign exchange, and of the imports it can buy, is at the heart of many of these diffi culties. And, as Quarcoo (1990) observes, the need to divert scarce foreign exchange derived from limited export proceeds to debt-service payments means that other critical development needs must be sacrifi ced. 
Political and governance obstacles to COMESA economic integration
For COMESA, some of the most recent political developments with a bearing on peace and regional economic integration are well known. They include the "Arab Spring," with its images of turmoil in the COMESA nations of Egypt (the Tahrir Square, Cairo, images and ouster of President Hosni Mubarak) and Libya (the uprisings that eventually saw the ouster and demise of longtime President Muammar Gaddafi ). As the World Bank (2011b) makes clear, there is little doubt and debate about the fact that, in Africa especially, good governance and leadership (and the accountability requirements embedded therein) are vital preconditions for the continent's economic development and social transformation. Yet, in much of the continent, a dangerous governance defi cit exists.
Infrastructural shortcomings
Lack of infrastructure dramatically hampers economic growth potential and the pace of regional economic integration generally. As the World Bank (2011b) observes, Africa's infrastructure services are typically seven times more expensive than those in other regions of the developing world. That is part of the reason why African exports suffer a cost disadvantage in world markets, presenting a key obstacle to the productive development of rural and urban areas. The need to increase and improve intra-COMESA and intra-Africa trade is perhaps self-evident. A critical catalyst for improving intra-COMESA trade should revolve around concerted and coordinated investment in infrastructure, widely defi ned to include transport corridorsincluding trans-COMESA highway projects of roads, railway networks, modernization of airports and air transportation; larger power generation projects, cross-COMESA transmission lines, fi ber-optic backbone, as well as maritime transportation for those COMESA nations with an outlet to the sea (Kenya, Comoros, Seychelles, and Djibouti). Effi cient and modern infrastructure will ensure, for instance, that it does not cost the same to ship a container from Lusaka (Zambia) to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia as it does Lusaka to New York. Transport for intra-COMESA trade (including roads, rail systems, air, and some shipping) is not only inadequate, but in many cases non-existent. Burundi, Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Rwanda, for instance, have no railway systems to talk about. Individual systems may also not always be fully compatible, especially in terms of intermodal transfer of goods. In some cases, parts of the network (especially in war-torn states) need urgent rehabilitation and upgrading.
COMESA and the South Africa factor
South Africa's role in any meaningful economic transformation in much of the African continent cannot be overemphasized. As Danso (1995) points out, South Africa's highly developed manufacturing sector producing such exportable items as food products, transportation equipment, machinery, and textiles, together with its fi nancial, technical, and capital assets, presents Africa (and especially COMESA, of which it is not a member) with the needed springboard for endogenous continental development and eventual African Union (AU) integration. As Jenkins (2001) makes clear, South Africa's size, relative to its neighbors, has several important implications for regional trade. First, the relationship is asymmetric in that South Africa is much more important to the region than the reverse. Second, South Africa runs, and will continue to run, a substantial trade surplus with each of its regional trading partners individually (as well as collectively). Intra-regional trade (with the exception of mineral exports) is heavily oriented towards South Africa ( Jenkins, 2001 ( Jenkins, 2001) .
Deleterious effects of war, violence, and drought on regional economic integration
War, disease, hunger, and displacement characterize many African lives (Nafziger, 2006) . Africa has a distressing list of countries that have experienced war, confl ict, and political instability. The World Bank (2011b) 
Emerging threat to economic integration -terrorism in Africa
Unfortunately for Africa, acts of terror have taken root on the continent in recent years, especially in the upper north of the continent. Suffi ce to cite, here, the suicide bombings in August 2011 at the UN offi ces in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, involving the extremist Muslim terror group Boko Haram -whose name translates roughly into "Western education is sinful" or "Western education is forbidden." The same group is suspected in the Christmas 2011 bombings of Christian churches and other locations in four Nigerian cities including, again, Abuja. What is the signifi cance of the Nigerian terrorist attacks in 2011? The following arguments can be advanced.
First, any loss of life is both unnecessary and regrettable. That in this case the loss of life happened at the hands of terrorists is both condemnable and reprehensible.
Impact on continental and Regional Economic Integration. Although Nigeria is not a member of COMESA, it is a member of Africa's third largest economic grouping in trade terms: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Four integrationrelated reasons make these terrorist attacks noteworthy:
• Nigeria has the largest population in Africa (some 154 million people), and the third largest economy on the continent (after South Africa and Egypt).
• Nigeria has oil, and is Africa's largest exporter of crude oil. Oil is an important engine of economic growth on which Africa's energy-led regional integration success will depend. • Abuja is the headquarters of ECOWAS; and ECOWAS is one of the regional economic trading blocs that constitute the main pillars of Africa's umbrella economic integration organization: the African Union.
• Abuja is AU headquarters of the equivalent of the European Commission's Central Bank:
the African Union's Central Bank. The terrorist attacks, therefore, may have happened in Nigeria but, as these logical linkages show, they have a deleterious impact on all of Africa, and the continent's regionalism efforts generally.
Bribery and corruption
Another obstacle to economic integration is the issue of bribery and corruption, a major impediment to economic growth and development in Africa generally. As in many other developing regions, corruption is prevalent at many levels and in different forms in COMESA and Africa -including government (and government ministries) in the awarding and execution of contracts, and at customs check points in many parts of COMESA. There are also cases of money laundering, and outright theft. Corruption in Africa runs deep. There is the incident of a one-month-old baby in Nigeria who holds a diploma and is on the government payroll to a former cabinet minister in Zambia who, in 2011, had some 2 billion Zambian Kwacha buried under his farmhouse outside Lusaka. Bribery and corruption are deleterious to regional economic integration efforts on many fronts (Grant, 1992) . These include, but are not limited to, obvious misuse of public funds that should go to investment in productive capacity to generating uncertainty and disinterest, on the part of foreign investors, in investing in highly corrupt regime nations.
COMESA's economic integration experience and progress
The road traveled, to this point, has taken us through some important regional economic integration terrain, including both the history and reasons for the existence of COMESA and attendant impediments to integration. In this section we ask, and address, the following practical and critical questions: and impediments to integration that were outlined in the previous section, has COMESA made any visible progress in achieving its key ideals since its formation?
COMESA facts, fi gures, and characteristics Population overall numbers : sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has an estimated population of some 841 million people, which is roughly 12 percent of the world's 2012 population of some 7 billion people. COMESA, alone, is home to 479.3 million of these, which (at 57 percent of SSA's population and 6.8 percent of the world's population) makes COMESA the largest of any of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs).
Some country-specifi c population highlights : Although Nigeria's 154.7 million people make it the largest in Africa (meaning that nearly 1 in every 5 Africans is a Nigerian), COMESA accounts for 6 of the 10 largest population countries in Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda.
COMESA's size in terms of land area : Not only is COMESA home to Africa's largest country in terms of land area (Sudan, at some 2.376 million square miles), this is also the largest regional trading bloc in terms of land square miles: some 12 million square miles, about 40 percent of Africa's land area.
COMESA's size in terms of key trade statistics : Although South Africa has by far the largest and most diversifi ed economy in Africa, at U.S.$244 billion in trade (2010 exports and imports) COMESA is Africa's largest trading block. Table 3 .3 also shows the following important trade, human development, and educational indicators for each of the 19 COMESA member countries at two points in time -in 1990, and then a comparative update in 2009/2010.
• Primary school, secondary school, and tertiary education: Table 3 .3 shows percentages of gross educational enrollments in each country where data is available. As Arimah (2004) rightly points out, a major aspect of human development is its emphasis on education and the acquisition of knowledge -a key instrument for empowerment, improving productivity, and combating absolute poverty. The impact of education on poverty can be assessed on a number of signifi cant fronts including -but not limited to -public/government expenditure on education, primary/secondary/tertiary school enrollment, and (especially in the case of COMESA and Africa) female educational enrollment and educational attainment. Public expenditure on education in Africa and COMESA is historically and disappointingly lowespecially when one considers the tremendous strides needed to educate African populations out of poverty, to say nothing about the continent's other complex development challenges.
• External debt: 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 2009-10 Population ( 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 1990 2009-10 2009-10 Population ( total external debt) at perhaps historically high levels in some cases. A key problem with high external debt scenarios is that most COMESA (and African) countries choose to service their debt at the expense of social service expenditures and poverty alleviation initiatives.
• Paved roads: Table 3 .3 gives some idea of the percentage of roads that are paved, out of the total road network in each country. This is an important infrastructure dimension, since successful regional trade and economic integration depends to a signifi cant degree on an effi cient road network. Unfortunately, much of the road network in COMESA is significantly underdeveloped. As Table 3 .3 demonstrates, the national percentage of paved road networks in COMESA is largely disappointing -from lows of 9 percent in Rwanda and 15 percent in both Ethiopia and Madagascar to highs of 69 percent in Comoros, 72 percent in Egypt, and 93 percent in Mauritius. It is clear that both Comoros and Mauritius "benefi t" from their relatively small land area and size: 2,171 square kilometers and 2,045 square kilometers, respectively. It is easier (though not easy) to upgrade roads in a small country.
• Foreign direct investment (FDI): Table 3 .3 shows that for 2009-10 much of the FDI into COMESA went to three countries: Libya, Egypt, and Sudan.
• Rural population as a percentage of each country's total population. This is an important indicator of urbanization levels and the extent of each country's need for key urbanization (and rural) services such as housing, sanitation, clean water, etc. • Life expectancy at birth, in years: The numbers in Table 3 .3 are, clearly, disappointing. According to the World Bank (2011a), which is the source for Table 3 .3 , life expectancy for SSA as of 2010 was 52.5 years. For the 19 COMESA countries, the average life expectancy was 58 years.
• Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births: This is an important measure of development and health standards generally. COMESA's record is poor in this regard. Whereas the infant mortality rate in SSA is a disappointing 81 deaths per 1,000 live births, the numbers in some COMESA countries are as high as 129 (Malawi), 126 (DR Congo as well as Djibouti), and 114 in Burundi.
• Improved water sources in rural areas: The percentage of each country's rural population with access to clean water is as low as 8 percent in Ethiopia and 16 percent in Madagascar, while the SSA average is 47 percent.
• Improved sanitation facilities in rural areas -that is, the percentage of each country's rural population with access to modern sanitation facilities: The fi gures in Table 3 .3 are largely low and therefore a source of concern for economic growth and development generally. In SSA, only 24.1 percent of the rural population has access to semi-modern and improved sanitation facilities. For COMESA, this number is at 36 percent of its rural population having access to sanitation and health facilities, with the following important caveats.
Only 3 of the 19 COMESA nations have at least 50 percent of their rural populations with access to sanitation facilities: Egypt (57 percent), Libya (96 percent) and Mauritius (90 percent). The three countries have rural populations that are less than the COMESA average of 65 percent -that is, 57 percent for Egypt, 22 percent for Libya, and 57 percent for Mauritius. The other 16 COMESA nations have fewer than 50 percent of their rural populations with access to modern amenities. In 7 of the 16 countries, the statistics are eyebrow-raising: only 1 percent of Ethiopia's rural population has access to improved sanitation facilities; this is a country where 83 percent of Ethiopia's 82.8 million people live in rural areas! The numbers are not that much better for DR Congo (only 4 percent of the 65 percent of its 66 million people who live in rural areas have access to modern amenities); Comoros (11 percent access/72 percent rural/700,000 total population); Kenya (27 percent access/78 percent rural/39.8 million total population); Madagascar (6 percent access/70 percent rural/19.6 million total population); and Sudan (23 percent access/56 percent rural population/42.3 million Sudanese).
Global COMESA trade and COMESA's major export markets
What is COMESA's global trade (exports and imports) picture and profi le? What are COMESA's key export markets? In other words, which countries or regions constitute COMESA's key trading partners, in terms of exports and imports? We address these questions in this section. Table 3 COMESA (2010) . Swaziland and Zimbabwe had some 53 percent of their total exports destined for the South African market, partly signifying the importance of South Africa to COMESA's regional economic integration agenda and experience. According to COMESA (2010), Eritrea and Rwanda were the only member countries to export over 50 percent of their products within the COMESA region in 2009 -that is, 57 percent for Eritrea and 52 percent for Rwanda. Uganda (at 39 percent) was another signifi cant exporter to the COMESA market.
A complement to both Table 3 .4 and Figure 3 .4 is Table 3 .5 , which gives dollar amounts of COMESA exports to various markets for the 11 years from 2000 to 2010. With regard to export markets for COMESA products, the European Union (EU) ranked number one with exports worth U.S.$5.3 billion in 2000, to a high of U.S.$43 billion destined to the EU market in 2010, up from U.S.$35 billion exported in 2009 -representing a 24 percent increase. Exports to the EU were primarily petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals from Libya. Ranked in position two after the EU was China as a major export market for COMESA products, with exports from COMESA worth over U.S.$17 billion in 2010, a 47 percent gain over the previous year's levels and up from only $332 million in 2000. 
Intra-COMESA trade (exports side)
There is a credible argument (by among others, the African Development Bank, 2004 ) that the success of regional economic integration can be measured, in part, by the extent to which it promotes intra-regional trade. The level of intra-regional trade, as Gibb (2006) points out, is a useful barometer of economic integration as well as regional cohesion more generally. Figure 3 .4 is complemented by Table 3 .5 , which shows intra-COMESA trade by country (in Table 3 millions of U.S. dollars) for 2009 and 2010. On the export side, we are talking about only 6 percent of total COMESA exports being to other nations within this regional trading block. Measured against COMESA's goal of increased trade (exports, in this case) within COMESA, the 6 percent demonstrates failure, so far, of a vital regional economic integration key performance indicator (KPI) and key results area (KRA). Intra-COMESA trade is rather small. As UNECA (2010) 
COMESA imports
What is the story on COMESA's Imports side? Figure 3 .5 has the details, which mirror those of Figure 3 .4 in all important respects. Only 4 percent of total COMESA imports are from other COMESA member nations. The difference with the 6 percent COMESA exports to COMESA fi gure is due to a number of factors including, but not limited to, re-exports and re-imports, as well as the fact that trade fi gures depend on individual national trade records, which in some instances may be either understated or overstated. All COMESA countries recorded upward trends in levels of their global imports in 2010 over 2009, except Rwanda and Madagascar, which experienced drops in import levels.
EU imports dominance
COMESA imports a substantial proportion of its goods and services from the European Union -which in 2009 accounted for some 35 percent of all COMESA imports as shown in Figure 3 .5 . Imports from the EU increased from US $34 billion in 2009 to over U.S.$37 billion in 2010, a growth rate of 9 percent. Ranked after the EU was China and South Africa as major sources of COMESA imports.
Why does the European Union dominate COMESA's exports and imports?
The reasons for Europe's predominance in trade with Africa and COMESA in particular have both historical and contemporary roots. Historical roots stem from the fact that a preponderance of African countries (and the vast majority of COMESA's 19 member states) were colonies of countries in Europe, especially Britain and France. There is no coincidence, therefore, that the two offi cial languages in COMESA are English and French. As former colonies of European countries, COMESA states have continued the long-standing trade ties with the European Union. Europe's appetite for raw materials from Africa has never waned, whether it be copper from Zambia or oil and gas from Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, or Algeria. In 2010, for instance, the top COMESA exports to the rest of the world (as well as within COMESA), according to COMESA (COMESA Secretariat, 2011), were primary products that included: copper ores and concentrates, black tea (fermented) and other partly fermented tea, portland cement, cane sugar (raw, in solid form, not containing value-added), refi ned copper, crude petroleum, motor vehicles for transport of persons, cobalt ores and concentrates, rice (semi-milled, wholly milled, whether or not polished and glazed), cobalt oxides and hydroxides, commercial cobalt oxides, palm oil (refi ned and its fractions), tobacco (wholly or partly stemmed or stripped), other beet or cane sugar in solid form, petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, liquefi ed butane, tobacco (not stemmed or stripped), plates and sheets/strips of refi ned copper, cigarettes containing tobacco, co-axial cable and other co-axial conductors, as well as ferrous products obtained by direct reduction of iron ore.
What's wrong with the foregoing COMESA exports picture? It is simply the fact that the bulk of the exports are semi-processed or primary products, with very little MVA (manufacturing value added). Essentially, it means that African countries sell cheap raw materials and semi-processed products to the developed West, and then have to buy back the processed, MVA, products from the West at more expensive prices, thereby worsening the terms of trade (TOT) for most COMESA and African countries.
COMESA's key achievements
There are two sides to every story. The story of COMESA that we have presented so far is one of signifi cant challenges, obstacles, and missed opportunities. But is it really all doom and gloom? The answer is no. COMESA has, in fact, made signifi cant and noteworthy strides and achievements in a number of areas. This subsection outlines the progress made by COMESA thus far.
As demonstrated in various tables, intra-COMESA trade volume has increased over timefor instance, from only U.S.$3.4 billion in exports and imports within the region in 2001 to U.S. $17.4 billion in 2010, a 400 percent upswing during this period. Why is this deemed to be progress and a success story? We made the argument, earlier, that the success of regional economic integration can be measured (at least in part) by the extent to which it promotes intra-regional trade. Although intra-COMESA trade percentages of global trade have remained fl at at 6 to 7 percent, volume levels have clearly risen over the years. Again, the downside to this increase in trade volume is that COMESA, like much of the rest of Africa, trades in unmanufactured products like minerals -rather than manufactured goods -which means that very little manufacturing value added is taking place in the region.
Another positive experience and trajectory is that tremendous potential exists for intra-COMESA trade in agricultural products, including trade in major staple food crops as well as livestock products. Of course, this potential increase assumes an improved and expanded COMESA infrastructural network especially, in this case, roads. Residents of COMESA member states now do not have restrictive travel (visa) requirements to visit other member states. This facilitates travel and helps to reduce transaction costs in the process. A signifi cant achievement, thus far, is the 2009 launch of the highly anticipated COMESA Customs Union, which was offi cially launched at the 13th summit of the COMESA Authority to eventually establish the common market.
Other notable COMESA achievements are as follows:
• the launching of a regional payment and settlement system (RPSS) to establish macroeconomic convergence in the region and contribute to the eventual establishment of the monetary union. The RPSS guarantees prompt payment for exports as well as other transfers, reduces foreign counterparty exposures and reduces foreign correspondent banking charges as payments are channeled through RPSS, which has lower charges for members, according to COMESA (COMESA Secretariat, 2011).
• the adoption of regulations on trade in services.
• the development of a climate change program within the framework of a comprehensive agriculture development plan, which aims to address the role of carbon in improving agricultural productivity in the region. The goal of the program is to contribute to the region's vision and efforts to achieving economic growth, improved livelihoods and climate protection.
• the elimination of non-tariff barriers: quantitative restrictions, licensing import permits, and restrictive foreign exchange controls have been largely eliminated in COMESA. A single COMESA customs documents (COMESA-CD) has been adopted to serve for the clearance of customs, warehousing, re-export, and transit purposes.
• the establishment of a customs bond guarantee scheme to facilitate transit traffi c and reduce the cost of fi nancing transit goods. It also has a third-party motor vehicle insurance scheme (the yellow card) to allow vehicles to circulate freely (COMESA Secretariat, 2011).
The role of mass media in regional economic integration and development
Someone has to tell the story of Africa's experience with economic integration and development generally. That is why this section on the role of media in regional integration became necessary. The role of media and technology in economic development was a dominant discourse in the fi elds of economics, international relations, and communications during the 1950s and 1960s. American scholars Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm were at the forefront of this discussion. They argued mass media and technologies are panaceas for social and economic development. The United Nations through its agency, the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) invested heavily in communication projects in developing countries. This dominant paradigm garnered a lot of criticism especially because it asserted that the transfer of goods, services, technologies, industries, and cultural values of the West to the developing countries would yield increased economic productivity. This assumption was fi ercely criticized by theorists from Latin America and Africa on the ground that mass media and technologies alone without local input are incapable of stimulating social and economic development. In essence, they were arguing that under this model, development was measured by the level of modernization and that modernization meant Westernization. An enduring argument is that mass media and media outlets (when localized and properly implemented) are proven to enhance and sustain the economic development of a nation or region based on the functions that mass media plays in a given society.
Media functions and possible challenges
Clearly, mass media are the vehicle for creating and transmitting information to a vast number of audiences. For successful economic integration, the need to initiate and maintain seamless communication among all stakeholders is paramount. Harold Lasswell (1948) was the fi rst scholar to put media's functions in perspective. He listed three functions of Surveillance, Correlation, and Transmission. Scholars over the years have added other functions and furthered the three original ones. Our discussion centers around modifi ed media functions as presented by Wilson, Gutierrez, and Chao (2003) , that is:
Surveillance : This is the sentinel or lookout role of media -that is, watching the society and horizon for threats to the established order, for information on people or places of public interest, and reporting these to stakeholder audiences.
Correlation : This is the interpretation and linking function of media, which helps the audience to understand, interpret, and comprehend what is happening in and out of the society (and how these events affect each other).
Transmission : This is the socialization function of media, in which the media defi ne society, its norms and values, to the audience and through their portrayals and coverage assist members of society in adopting, using, and acting on those values.
Economic : This deals with the role of the media within the economic system of a society. There is also a fi fth function, that of Entertainment , which entails using media for diversion and entertainment.
How, then, can mass media aid COMESA's economic integration process?
The merit of mass media in this realm is twofold. First, it is a vehicle upon which the economic and social development and integration policies and plans are transmitted to people. Second, since it is capable of sustainability, it is therefore an economic and social tool capable of defi ning society, highlighting the values, and compelling the audience to adopt, use, and act on those values as the transmission function indicates. To avoid ambiguity, this section will follow the simple journalistic "5 Ws and an H" model: the "Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How" of media.
Who : Who should produce, send, and receive information? African governments, corporations, policy makers, enterprises, institutions, interest groups, and, yes, even rural farmers, traders, fi shermen and small business owners.
What : What information should be disseminated to stakeholders? As the surveillance function of media indicates, media can and should provide information on people or places of public interest. This includes government information on fi scal and judicial decisions, economic information regarding business owners and consumers, educational information including vocational training, literacy opportunities, health communication that transmits both preventive and curative medical information like diseases, vaccinations, epidemic, healthy lifestyles, as well as market and business information, both regional and international.
Where : "Where" addresses the issue of conduits through which economic integration information can and needs to be transmitted. Mass media is that vehicle. Conversely, the goal of mass media in economic integration can fully be attained if the right medium is used for the right people and at the right time.
When : The "When" addresses the time frame for information gathering and dissemination. Similar to news, most information has a very short shelf life. Delayed information in some cases, may be as good as no information, especially in situations that warrant immediate attention. The surveillance function of mass media entails media playing the information transmission and watchdog roles simultaneously. This is imperative because, while the media ensures that pertinent information is gathered and transmitted to all stakeholders, it should equally hold government, policy makers, and corporations accountable for fulfi lling the plans of economic integration in a timely fashion without undue corruption and/or disruption of processes. Elliott and Anderson (2007) presented case studies on the impact of mass media in reforming rural business in Africa. Some of the compelling stories involved mass media uncovering exploitation of farmers in Northern Uganda.
Press freedom in Africa has been both sporadic and disappointing. Many African nations have had fl uctuating rankings on the World's Press Freedom Index. An example is presented in Table 3 .6 , a 10-year comparative analysis of press freedom rank according to Reporters Without Borders (2012). The table compared 2002 and 2012 reports and showed that, in 2001, Eritrea and Zimbabwe were highlighted as "Bad examples of press in Africa," ranking 132 and 122 respectively.
In 2012, although Zimbabwe was still within the press repressive range, it ranked 117 (in comparison to 122 a decade earlier). Eritrea, on the other hand, went further down in rank to 179, compared to 132 a decade earlier. For the "Good examples" group, only Mali and Namibia maintained their ranking as "Satisfactory situation" and "Good situation" respectively in 2012. Africa, therefore, should strive towards democratizing its media and providing leverage for mass media outlets to objectively report development issues, economic integration objectives, policies for their implementation and practices without undue agendasetting or framing propaganda. Figure 3 .6 provides a comprehensive map of press freedom in Africa with a majority of African countries falling within "Noticeable Problems", "Diffi cult Situations", and "Very Serious Situations". Why : The "Why" concept addresses the question, Why are mass media the best vehicle for transmitting economic integration and development information? Mass media are capable of reaching the highest number of people at the same time while cutting across geographic, socio-economic, and literacy barriers. With internet advances, media can also cut across barriers of content contribution and provide people at the grassroots opportunities to participate in economic debates.
How : The fi nal question then is, How should economic integration information be disseminated for better understanding and feedback without altering the economic integration message? In discussing mass media, our focus is not only on the equipment but on the format of delivery, and all involved in the processes -people, corporations, and organizations. Key to effective mass media is the ability to promote regional economic integration by reporting information without undue inhibition, while upholding diversity of opinion, stories, and press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html sources, and ensuring that all stakeholders have access to the information (Islam, 2002; Roy, 2012) .
In addition to mass media, information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as computers, cellular phones, smart phones, tablets, and any device that can receive, store, manipulate, and transmit information are capable of furthering the plans of regional economic integration. COMESA has developed regional guidelines focusing on technical assistance, cost modeling, and close collaboration with the East African Community (EAC) that enable rural connectivity, capacity building, applications, and services (ITU, 2011) . The ITU report of 2011 listed Botswana, Cape Verde, Maldives, and the Pacifi c Islands as cases where investment in ICT has contributed greatly to economic growth.
Economic integration and corporate Africa: conclusions, lessons, and business implications in the twenty-fi rst century
Going forward, it should come as no surprise, perhaps, that the areas and sectors in which Africa has the most severe congenital and development gaps also present some of the most attractive business and economic growth opportunities. In this section, we identify and analyze some of these business implications for companies and institutions in Africa -as well as other stakeholders in the continent's quest for economic regeneration. A number of policyrelated lessons and conclusions are also advanced. Economic integration is a complex process. Africa, unfortunately, has yet to succeed in having a regional grouping that has all three fundamental conditions necessary for the success of economic integration: sustained political commitment, regular growth of national Figure 3 .6 2012 World press freedom ranking economies, and no major economic sub-regional disparity. In making the suggestions and recommendations below, the authors are alive to the fact that any strategy is only as good as its implementation. Integration strategy implementation in Africa has a greater chance of success if it is rooted on four themes and pillars: knowledge, consultation, fi nance and partnerships; all taking place at the local, national, regional and, where applicable, global levels.
Education above all else
Education and an educated citizenry is a necessary precondition for the success of any regional and transformative economic grouping, and for economic development generally. Stated differently, education is the blood that runs through the veins of any effective regional economic grouping. This is so because it is in the area of education and educational enhancements that the greatest difference can be made in Africa's job creation, especially for young people and African women. Statistics were provided earlier in this chapter on the state of education in COMESA and Africa generally. The story coming out of those numbers is that there is an ever-present and urgent need to improve universities in COMESA; to increase academic contact with countries outside Africa; to develop tertiary and technical education programs; and to expand overall access to quality education -especially for women.
The 2011 World University Web Rankings (see http://www.4icu.org/ ) lists the top 100 universities in Africa, from which we can draw the following interpretive highlights:
• 34 of the top 100 universities in Africa (that is, 34 percent) are in COMESA.
• 21 of the top 100 African universities (21 percent) are in the SADC nation of South Africa. • 14 of the 100 top universities are in Egypt (a COMESA country), accounting for 14 percent of Africa's total, and 41 percent of the COMESA total.
• The top 10 universities in Africa are either in South Africa (7 of 10, i.e., 70 percent) or in Egypt. The three universities in Egypt are Cairo University, the American University in Cairo, and Mansoura University).
Voices from the poor and marginalized -high poverty levels and high foreign debt levels
The most important reason for the existence of COMESA is both a moral and economic imperative. There are too many poor people in the region -and Africa's poor are, in fact, poorer -than in any other area of the world. In order to improve the quality of life and living conditions of people in member states, priority needs to be on social sector development in tandem with economic initiatives. This includes (but is certainly not limited to) the need to improve healthcare, water, and sanitation services through infrastructure development, education, and skills enhancement. Paraphrasing an unidentifi ed author, if the chronically poor could talk -that is, if they were capable of infl uencing both "donor" community and COMESA government policy -they would say something along the lines of: labor is our most abundant asset. Crop production is, for us rural people, our only real source of income. Please grade the roads, and repair the bridges, so that we do not have to walk on foot to get to town to sell our produce. And, when harvesting season is around the corner, could the government and our members of parliament -who like to live in town and only show up every fi ve years when it's election time -please see that we have a fair chance of marketing our crops? Surely, that is not too much to ask.
Gender mainstreaming -pivoting to African women
COMESA recognizes the need to create an environment where both men and women have equal opportunity to fulfi ll their full potential. Africa's underdevelopment can be traced (to a signifi cant degree) to widespread and longstanding inattention to women. Any realistic and broad-based COMESA development strategy must be woman-centered for a number of reasons. First, such a strategy begins with a recognition that women in Africa are critical contributors to and benefi ciaries from development, and yet in much of Africa they still lack legal and property rights and access to fi nance as well as modern business practices. And as the World Bank (2011b) reminds us, African women also risk dying from childbirth at alarming rates -with Africa's maternal mortality accounting for some 47 percent of global incidence, raising it to the level of Africa's "neglected Millennium Development Goal." The plight of women must, therefore, be incorporated in any economic development strategy. This can be done by, among other initiatives:
• Broader and deeper investment in the education of girls and women on the part of key stakeholders: local offi cials, provincial offi cials, country offi cials and governments, as well as global donors and multilateral institutions.
• Programs that deliberately target the job placement and employment of employmenteligible girls and women. This is especially so in sectors such as agriculture, education services, and infrastructural projects.
• Programs that deliberately empower women in the acquisition and utilization of credit and broader range of fi nancial services. • Donor agency programs that "empower women", that are "women-centered" and that generally protect against the exploitation and discrimination of women.
Towards a new "rural-centric" multipronged development strategy for COMESA and Africa
There are some specifi cs we know regarding the rural versus urban dichotomy in Africa. Provided by the World Bank (2011a), the following are the summary statistics:
• It is a known fact that much of Africa depends on agriculture for the livelihoods of the people of the continent. The bulk of this agricultural production takes place in rural areas. • In 1960 Africa was a net exporter of food. Today, the continent imports one-third of its grain.
• Declining soil fertility, land degradation and other factors have led to a 23 percent decrease in food production per capita in the last 25 years, even though population has increased dramatically.
• For the African farmer, conventional fertilizers now cost two to six times more than the world market price.
• Table 3 .3 showed that 63 percent of the population in SSA lives in rural areas. In the 19 COMESA countries, however, this fi gure is two percentage points higher, at 65 percent.
• Much of Africa depends on agriculture economically, and as a source of livelihood for a majority of the population.
• Above 80 percent of farmers in Africa are women, yet more than 40 percent of women in Africa do not have access to basic education. These are the same rural areas:
• Where poverty is higher in Africa, and is highest especially among women. Poverty has a female face, and an African child's face.
• Where much of the important infrastructure is absent or rudimentary at best. For instance, much of the road network that should facilitate agricultural activity in COMESA is largely underdeveloped, with paved roads as a percentage of total roads accounting for as low as 9 percent of all roads in Rwanda and 15 percent in both Ethiopia and Madagascar according to the World Bank (2011a).
• Where, as we showed in Table 3 .3 , only 36 percent of the rural population has access to some kind of semi-modern to improved sanitation and health facilities. SSA, as a whole, is at only 24.1 percent of the rural population having access to sanitation facilities according to the World Bank (2011a).
Important question : Given all the important facts and fi gures presented above -in addition to the many other facts and fi gures that we generally know about rural Africa -is it not most appropriate, in fact, for African governments, the COMESA Authority, and multilateral lenders to embrace a multi-pronged "rural-centric" development strategy?
COMESA infrastructure revitalization and development
The need to increase and improve intra-COMESA and intra-Africa trade is perhaps selfevident. A critical catalyst for improving intra-COMESA trade should revolve around concerted and coordinated investment in infrastructure, widely defi ned to include transport corridorsincluding trans-COMESA highway projects of roads, railway networks, modernization of airports and air transportation; larger power generation projects, cross-COMESA transmission lines, fi ber-optic backbone, as well as maritime transportation for those COMESA nations with an outlet to the sea (Kenya, Comoros, Seychelles, Djibouti, and others). Effi cient and modern infrastructure will ensure, for instance, that it does not cost the same to ship a container from Lusaka (Zambia) to Addis Ababa in Ethiopia as it does from Lusaka to New York. The World Bank (2008) is correct in arguing that stronger, and better connected, infrastructure platforms can unlock economies of scale and sharpen competitiveness in Africa, and especially for the 15 African nations that have no direct outlets to the sea -including seven of the COMESA countries that are landlocked. The World Bank makes the further useful point that improved regional infrastructure will facilitate more intra-regional trade and exports from the continent, thereby enhancing Africa's economic growth and poverty alleviation agenda. This entails a strategy of infrastructure support and enhancement in the following areas (World Bank, 2008 ):
• Broadening, deepening, and upgrading key trade corridors and transportation networks not only in COMESA, but also the entire African Union generally. In terms of strategy (the "how do we get there" question), the need for enhanced country-specifi c, regional as well as global fi nancial and human (expertise) resources can obviously not be overemphasized. It is as urgent as it is necessary. • Landlocked countries, especially, must have access to at least one legally secure, protected, and structurally sound trade route to the sea by 2030 if Africa is to make real headway in intra-regional and global trade generally.
• Enhancing and deepening access to a broad portfolio of energy sources, while at the same time improving supply reliability.
• The need to broaden/expand, deepen, and improve information communication and technology (ICT) in Africa is, perhaps, self-evident.
Energy sector revitalization
"COMESA cannot grow and develop in darkness." Electricity, especially, has the potential to reduce the production cost for companies and industries in COMESA, thereby creating more jobs, promoting small-scale enterprises (SSEs), as well as increasing and improving information fl ow in the trading block and in Africa generally. A broader focus on job-creating renewable energy is indeed needed in COMESA member nations, especially given Africa's abundance of natural resources and the realistic global threat of climate change. A clear example is the U.S. $800 million Bujagali Power Project in Uganda (See World Bank, 2011b) , which provides clean renewable energy to an otherwise power-defi cit area. Africa, generally, should double efforts by individual countries and regional economic groupings aimed at broadening and diversifying renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and geothermal power. Africa has some of the largest lakes and dams in the world. Of the world's 10 largest lakes, three are in Africa (Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, and Lake Malawi/Nyasa). The continent also has some of the largest dams in the world: Kariba Dam, Aswan Dam, Akosombo Dam, and the Cahora Bassa Dam, among others. It has some of the largest rivers as well, with huge potential for hydro-electric power generation: the Congo/Zaire River (the deepest river in the world and the world's third largest), the Nile River (longest in Africa), the Zambezi River, Limpopo River, and River Niger.
Triad consensus on regional economic integration
Regional economic integration (including that involving COMESA) is a prelude to continental African Union integration, and clearly is an important imperative in Africa's quest for economic growth generally. There is a type of triad consensus when it comes to Africa's economic integration efforts, which hinges on three key results areas (KRAs) -see, among others, World Bank (2008):
• That strengthening and broadening Africa's growth requires policies that are more outward-looking, with due emphasis placed on foreign-exchange generating exports. • That regional integration is indispensable in Africa's quest to meet the competitiveness challenges of globalization.
• That policies for regional, continental, and global integration are in fact complementary, and therefore need to be pursued with equal vigor -and enthusiasm.
Some concluding observations and caveats
The recommendations in this chapter are cognizant of the following realities:
• That African countries -and COMESA member states in particular -are in fact different and not homogeneous. They have, for instance, different private and public sector capacities and endowments. • COMESA member states have different levels of economic development; different types and levels of infrastructure; and different levels of diffusion of natural resources.
• As the World Bank (2011b) observes, economic blocs such as COMESA attempt to implement regional strategies in what is essentially a multi-country based environment.
• As such, some of the strategies at regional level may be too comprehensive and general to lend themselves to easy prioritization at the individual country level. Not only should prioritization take place at individual COMESA country level, in most cases the requisite resources are both limited as well as country-specifi c or country-generated -as, indeed, are key quantitative performance indicators (KPIs) needed to monitor and measure economic progress.
• Equally important, COMESA member countries face different levels of democratic governance, political stability/instability, infrastructural endowments or defi cits, and overall social conditions and dimensions. In other words, COMESA strategy implementation is largely a country-level process.
Directions for future research
In this section, we advance three strands and avenues for possible future research on regionalism in Africa.
• On intra-regional trade : Future research in this area would prove more enlightening if it explored a comparative perspective involving all eight of Africa's 1991 Abuja Treaty recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. Which RECs have the better intra-regional trade percentages and volumes, and can we account for these higher numbers to provide lessons for other RECs? • On infrastructural development and applied research : It is equally opportune for future research to explore how much the continent would have to invest -and identify potential investorsin order for Africa to pave and tar the rural roads that are so critical to infrastructure regeneration and economic growth generally.
• Formative evaluation of current implementation of media in economic integration: While the media integration section in the chapter cited a few practices, a majority of our proposals were theoretical. Future research in form of a formative evaluation of current application of media in economic integration in Africa has the potential to advance media best practices as well as challenges in regional economic integration.
